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1. ABSTRACT 
 
 
Defaulted retail mortgage loans as a percentage of retail mortgage loans and advances averaged 9 
percent over 2010 as reported in the SARB Bank Supervision Annual report.  Banks are in the 
business of risk taking and as a result need to constantly evaluate and review credit risk management 
to attain sustained profitability.  In credit risk modelling, default risk is associated with client-
specific factors particularly the client’s credit rating.  However, Brent, Kelly, Lindsey-Taliefero, and 
Price (2011), have shown that variation in mortgage delinquencies reflect changes in general 
macroeconomic conditions.  This study aims to provide evidence of whether macroeconomic factors 
such as the house price index, CPI, credit growth, debt to income ratio, prime interest rates, and 
unemployment, are key drivers of residential mortgage delinquencies and default in South Africa.  In 
this study, data from an undisclosed bank is used to estimate three models that are supposed to 
capture the influence of several macroeconomic variables on 30 day, 60 day, and 90 day delinquency 
rates over the 2006-2010 period.  In order to eliminate the potential bias introduced by those 
observations, a fourth model was estimated using aggregated banking industry published by the 
SARB.  However, due to data constraints, only the severe mortgage delinquency state, that is the 90 
day delinquency rate was modelled using this aggregate data.  The SARB sample covers the period 
between 2008 and 2010.  The choice of the date 2008 coincides with the introduction of the Basel 2 
regulatory framework.  Prior to 2008, the big four South African banks were governed by the Basel 1 
framework, and  measured their credit risk using the so-called Standardised Approach which has 
different loan categories and different default definitions compared to the Basel 2 Advanced Internal 
Ratings Approach adopted in 2008.  
The findings suggest that the two samples (i.e. the data from the individual bank and the SARB data) 
imply different explanatory macroeconomic factors.  Prime interest rates were found to be the only 
important variable in determining 30 day and 60 day delinquency rates for the individual bank.  The 
house price index, CPI, credit growth, and prime interest rates were found to be the main 
determinants of the 90 day delinquency rates for the undisclosed bank, while the house price index, 
CPI, and credit growth, determine the 90 day delinquency rates for the big four banks. 
 
Key Words: Risk, Credit Risk, Default Risk, Residential Mortgages, Profitability,  
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   2. INTRODUCTION  
 
 
A bank is a financial institution and like any other firm its main objective is maximization of profits 
and shareholders wealth.  The severe 2007 - 2009 financial market meltdown and high defaulted 
exposures induced by the downturn in the housing sector and the bursting of the housing bubble, 
presented a challenge to the attainment of strong financial results.  Attributable earnings for Absa’s 
Retail banking declined by 21,1 percent to R2 863 million partially due to a sharp increase in 
impairments of 40,8 percent.  (ABSA Group Annual Results December 2009).  Similarly, the 
impairment charge for Nedbank Retail, South Africa’s fourth largest bank by asset size, increased by 
35,7 percent to R4 925 million mainly due to home loans defaulted advances, which  increased by 
58,5 percent on 2008.  (Nedbank Group Annual Results December 2009).  According to Nedbank, 
increasing impairments resulted in reduced earnings levels compared with the period ending at 
December 2008.   
The financial meltdown combined with the high indebtedness of South African households 
highlighted the need for improved methodologies to better quantify banks’ vulnerabilities to different 
types of economic shocks.  In addition, high levels of non-performing loans undermine the bank’s 
ability to function as intermediaries, which is matching the needs of a surplus (deficit) unit, either a 
business firm, government agency or an individual with the deficit (surplus) of another.  
Banks are required to hold adequate credit impairments against non-performing loans to ensure that 
they are compensated for risks incurred and to protect depositors.  The credit impairments limit the 
capital available for lending to the public, and thus constrain economic growth.  Credit impairments 
are reserve accounts kept aside as provisions for loan losses.  They divided into two categories 
namely; specific impairments, and portfolio impairments.  Specific impairments are those that a bank 
views as being associated with a particular loan.  While portfolio impairments are general provisions 
not allocated to a particular loan but are calculated based on average historical loan losses.  Credit 
impairments appear on both the income statement and balance sheet.  The balance sheet impairments 
are reduced from the total loans receivable (see line 4 in figure 2), this adjustment is done to ensure 
that the bank’s assets are not overstated but show the portion of loans that will be collected.  The 
balance sheet account is established and maintained by monthly charges against earnings.  The 
charges appear on the income statement as an expense named the income statement charge (see line 
10 in figure 3).  The balance sheet impairment is increased by an amount equivalent to the amount 
charged against earnings as an income statement charge (see line 2 in figure 1 and line 10 in figure 
3).  Increases in impairments occur when (1) it has become apparent that a loan is more likely to be 
in part or wholly uncollectible; (2) an unanticipated write-off has occurred for which the bank did 
not set aside reserves; or (3) the amount of loans in the bank’s portfolio has increased. 
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Figure 1 illustrates how the balance sheet impairments are calculated, while figures 2 and 3 below 
show how the income statement charge, and balance sheet impairments are reported in the respective 
financial statements.  The figures reported do not reflect actual financial statements of the banks 
investigated. 
 
Figure 1: Calculation of balance sheet impairments 
 
Figure 2: Balance sheet impairments example 
 
Figure 3: Income statement impairments example 
 
According to the December 2010 Bank Supervision Annual report, the South African banking sector 
has 17 registered banks, 2 registered mutual banks and 13 registered international banks whose 
principal activities are to collect deposits from customers with excess funds and disburse loans to 
customers with insufficient. (South African Reserve Bank Supervision Annual Report 2010).  
CALCULATION OF BALANCE SHEET IMPAIRMENTS
1 Opening balance (begining 2009) 9 000                   
2 Add Income Statement charge 3 000                   
3 Add Recoveries 850                       
4 Less:Amounts written off in 2009 2 850                   
5 Closing balance (end 2009) 10 000                 
R'm
ASSETS LIABILITIES AND EQUITY
1 Cash 80 000                 9 Deposits 740 000               
2 Securities 200 000               10 Other Liabilities 190 000               
3 Total Loans 640 000          11 Total Liabilities 930 000               
4 Less: Balance Sheet Impairments 10 000            
5 Net loans 630 000               
6 Property 4 000                   12 Owners Equity 70 000                 
7 Other Assets 86 000                 
8 TOTAL ASSETS 1 000 000            13 TOTAL LIABILITIES AND OWNERS EQUITY 1 000 000            
ABC Bank
BALANCE SHEET AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2009
ABC Bank
R'm
INTEREST INCOME
1 Interest  and fees on Loans 70 000            
2 Interest on Securities 18 000            
3 Other Interest Income 2 000              
NON-INTEREST INCOME
4 Service Charges 4 000              
5 Other non-interest income 6 000              
6 TOTAL INCOME 100 000          
INTEREST EXPENSE
7 Interest on deposits 40 000            
8 Other interest expense 20 000            
NON-INTEREST EXPENSE
9 Salaries 10 000            
10 Income Statement Charge 3 000              
11 Other non-interest expense 17 000            
12 TOTAL EXPENSES 90 000            
13 INCOME BEFORE TAX 10 000                 
14 Income tax 2 500                   
15 NET INCOME 7 500                   
INCOME STATEMENT FOR YEAR ENDING 31 DECEMBER 2009
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Figure 4 below provides a graphical representation of South African banking sector assets and loans 
to customers. 
 
Figure 4: Total banking assets, gross loans and advances and respective growth rates 
 
Source: SARB - Bank Supervision Annual Report 2010 
 
The South African banking sector is dominated by four banks namely,  Amalgamated Banks  of 
South Africa (ABSA), First National Bank (FNB), The Standard Bank of South Africa (SBSA) and 
Nedbank. The four banks contributed 84, 6 percent to the balance-sheet size of the banking sector at 
December 2010, with loans and advances accounting 74 percent of these assets.  (South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB) Supervision Annual Report 2010). The loans and advances asset category 
comprise of the following loan types; 
i. Homeloans 
ii. Term loans 
iii. Other 
iv. Lease and instalment debtors 
v. Commercial Mortgages 
vi. Loans granted/deposits placed under resale agreements  
vii. Overdrafts 
viii. Bank intra group balances 
ix. Credit Cards 
x. Redeemable preference shares 
xi. Term loans 
xii. Factoring accounts, trade bills and bankers’ acceptances 
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Figure 5 shows the composition of the above loan types at December 2009 and 2010. 
 
Figure 5: Total gross loans by product and respective growth rates 
 
Source: SARB - Bank Supervision Annual Report 2010 
 
The abovementioned loan types expose banks to the risks of not realising the expected returns on 
assets.  According to Van Greuning and Bratanovic (2003), banking risk fall into four main 
categories namely, operational, financial, business, and event risks.  Financial risks include liquidity, 
credit, solvency, interest rate, currency, and market price risks.  Operational risks are related to a 
bank’s overall organisation and functioning of internal systems, including computer related and other 
technologies; compliance with bank policies and procedure; and measures against mismanagement 
and fraud.  Business risks are related with a bank’s business environment, including macroeconomic 
and policy concern, legal and regulatory factors and the overall financial sector infrastructure and 
payment system.  Lastly, event risks include all types of exogenous risks.  Figure 6 shows the 
different risk types.   
 
Figure 6: Banking risk categories 
 
Source: Van Greuning and Bratanovic (2003) 
 
Although the other risks are all important and could cause bank runs if not efficiently managed, the 
study focuses only on credit risk.  Credit risk is the dominant source of risk for most lending banks, 
BALANCE SHEET 
STRUCTRE INTERNAL FRAUD MACRO POLICY POLITICAL
INCOME STATEMENT 
STRUCTURE EXTERNAL FRAUD
FINANCIAL 
INFRASTUCTURE CONTAGION
CAPITAL ADEQUACY
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 
AND SAFTY
LEGAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE BANKING CRISES
CREDIT
CLIENTS, PRODUCTS AND 
BUSINESS SERVICES LEGAL LIABILITY OTHER EXOGENEOUS
LIQUIDITY
DAMAGE TO PHYSICAL 
ASSETS
REGULATORY 
COMPLIANCE
MARKET
BUSINESS DISCRUPTION 
AND SYSTEM FAILURES
REPUTATTIONAL AND 
FIDUCIARY
CURRENCY
EXECUTION, DELIVERY 
AND PROCESS 
MANAGEMENT COUNTRY RISK
FINANCIAL RISKS OPERATIONAL RISKS BUSINESS RISKS EVENT RISKS
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since the balance sheet of lending banks mostly comprise of loans and advances.  These findings are 
consistent with South African trends.  Loans and advances represented, on average, 74 percent of 
banking sector total assets during 2010 (2009: 73 percent).  (SARB Supervision Annual Report 
2010). Among the different loan types, homeloans remain major constituents of gross loans and 
advances, accounting for 35, 3 percent at the end of December 2010 (December 2009: 34, 9 percent).  
Given these statistics, it is evident that poor credit models for home loans could adversely affect the 
financial position and performance of banks.  
The objective of the study is to quantify the impact of macroeconomic factors on the default risk of 
South African home loans.  In their study of Mortgage Delinquency Migration, Gloy and Stokes 
(2007) argue that while mortgage delinquency is not a sufficient condition to insure default, it is a 
necessary condition for default as loans will generally progress through various states of delinquency 
prior to default.  Therefore, they believe a better understanding of mortgage default should be 
obtainable through a better understanding of the dynamics of mortgage delinquency.  
In this study, data from an undisclosed bank is used to estimate three models that are supposed to 
capture the influence of several macroeconomic variables on 30 day, 60 day, and 90 day delinquency 
rates over the 2006 - 2010 period.  In order to eliminate the potential bias introduced by those 
observations, a fourth model was estimated using aggregated banking industry data published by the 
SARB.  However, due to data constraints, only the severe mortgage delinquency state, that is the 90 
day delinquency rate was estimated using aggregated data.  Campbell and Dietrich (1983) stated that 
substantial explanatory power may be lost when national aggregates are used. 
The analysis aims to provide information that will allow banks to improve assessments during 
underwriting to implement strategies that improve the default resolution process.  If macroeconomic 
factors are found not to impact on residential default risk, then banks can focus on borrower specific 
factors as the sole determinants of credit risk.  Alternatively, if macroeconomic factors are indeed 
found to impact on residential mortgage default risk, then focus should be stressed on those factors 
as well when modelling credit risk and not purely borrower specific variables.  The inclusion of the 
borrower variables in the sample would lead to another research line which is beyond the scope of 
this paper.  The paper consists of four chapters of discussion and analysis, where; 
• Chapter 3 covers the literature review and research hypothesis. 
• Chapter 4 presents the research methodology.  
• Chapter 5 presents regressions and empirical findings of the study. 
• Chapter 6 highlights conclusions and recommendations. 
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2.1 Problem Statement  
Non-performing loans continued to grow in the first half of 2010, peaking at R123, 4 billion in May 
2010.  (SARB Quarterly Bulletin December 2010).  Despite the establishment of The National Credit 
Act (NCA) in 2007, household debt remained at a high of 76, 5 percent in the second quarter of 2010 
as reported in the SARB quarterly bulletin.  The National Credit Act aims to solve specific problems 
in the existing consumer-credit market, including the prohibition of reckless lending by credit 
providers, the prevention and alleviation of the over indebtedness of consumers, and the prevention 
of the high costs of credit.  
 
In credit risk modelling, default risk is associated with borrower-specific factors, particularly credit 
rating, but studies of Determinants of Mortgage Delinquency by Howard University have shown that 
variation in delinquency and default rates, over time reflect changes in borrower characteristics and 
changes in general economic conditions.   
 
2.2 Purpose of the Study  
The study aims to provide evidence of whether macroeconomic factors are key drivers of non- 
performing home loans in the South African banking sector.  If macroeconomic factors are found not 
to impact on home loan default risk, then banks can focus on firm specific factors as the sole 
determinants of credit risk.  Alternatively, if macroeconomic factors are indeed found to impact on 
residential mortgage default risk, then focus should also be stressed on those factors when modelling 
credit risk.  The analysis will provide information that will allow banks to improve assessments 
during underwriting and assist in implementing strategies that improve the default resolution process.   
 
2.3 Significance of the Problem 
Given the interdependencies in the economy, accurate risk measures would support the capital 
allocation and strategic schemes of the bank in a globally competitive environment. 
Risk managers would be interested in questions like “what would be the impact on default risk of the 
residential mortgage portfolio if there would be a 3 percentage points increase for example in prime 
interest rates.  This is known as stress testing.  This information would aid them in adapting credit 
risk policies and practises to control and avoid losses.  An example of such a credit policy would be 
tightening the loan-to-value ratios to prohibit additional home loan lending when prime interest rates 
hit 3 percentage points and are higher than existing level of rates. 
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This chapter offers a review of the relevant theoretical foundation, existing empirical evidence upon 
which this study is based, and the research hypothesis.  The first section describes the structure of the 
South African mortgage market.  Section 2 introduces the concept of mortgage default which helps 
to explain the subsequent theoretical review provided in section 3.  Finally, section 4 covers the 
research hypothesis. 
 
3.1 The structure of South African mortgage market 
Residential mortgage loans are extended by a number of banks and specialist mortgage lending 
institutions in South Africa.  The largest of these, as illustrated in the graph below, are Nedbank, 
ABSA Bank, Standard Bank and First National Bank.  At the end of 2010, home loans advanced by 
Absa, Standard Bank, First Rand and Nedbank where R248 million, R247 million, R149 million and 
R136 million respectively.  (SARB Bank Return 900, 2010)  
The overall home loans accounted 35, 3 percent of total gross loans and advances loans.  South 
African Reserve Bank Supervision Annual Report 2010). Since 1999, specialist mortgage lenders 
such as SA Home Loans (SAHL) and Mortgage SA have successfully entered the residential 
mortgage market.   
 
The South African big four banks target the low risk, upper income segment of the residential 
mortgage market.  Since 1994 the objective of the national housing policy has been the provision of 
credit for low income households.  The national housing policy aims to assist low income earners by 
increasing the engagement of banks in the high risk low income housing finance sector.  The 
legislative pressure to serve the low income housing finance market has required formal banks to 
develop products without increasing their exposure and compromising returns.   
A particular challenge is the fact that mortgage bonds are considered inappropriate for low income 
borrowers because of their limited understanding of mortgages.  According to Marais, Botes, Pelser 
and Venter (2005), 22 percent of low-income home-owners default because they do not understand 
the regulations applicable to housing, or do not realise the consequences of non-payment.  (Marais et 
al., 2005) quoted (Rust, 2002), that low-income home-owners do not seek appropriate advice in the 
event of hardship or a crisis.   
 
The South African residential mortgage market over the last years has been dominated by variable 
interest rates, with less than 10 percent of all mortgages financed at a fixed rate.  A fixed rate is a 
contracted rate between the bank and the borrower for a pre-determined period of time.  A variable 
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
14 
 
interest rate is a fluctuating rate based on the prime lending rate as determined from time to time.  
The features of the two types of rates are as follows; 
• Fixed interest rates 
o The rate will be fixed at a pre-determined rate for a specified period. 
o These rates are not influenced by fluctuations in the mortgage prime lending rate. 
o A fixed rate option contract may not be terminated prior to the expiry of the agreed 
term. 
o A client may change to variable interest rate option; however it can be applied once 
the fixed rate option expires as per the agreement. 
• Variable interest rates 
o Fluctuations in the prime lending rate influence the variable interest rate.  
o The interest rate option cannot be fixed for a pre-determined period.  
o Banks determine the rates based on an individual’s risk profile and property details. 
 
3.2 The concept of mortgage default 
Under the Advanced Internal Ratings Based approach, credit exposures are classified as either 
“current,” “30 days past due,” “60 days past due” or “90 plus days past due,” where the latter 
classification represents exposures in default.  A mortgage loan is current when the borrower has 
made all of the contractually required monthly payments.  It is 30 days past due when the borrower 
has missed one monthly payment, it is 60 days past due when the borrower has missed two monthly 
payments, and it is 90-plus-days past due when the borrower has missed three or more monthly 
payments.  The 90 plus days past due loan category consists of defaulted exposures entering the 90 
plus day past due bucket for the first time, properties in possession, restructured loans, debt in 
counselling loans and loans in foreclosure process.   
 
The mortgage contract gives the Bank the right to demand full payments of the loan when the 
counterparty fails to meet the contractual obligations.  This means the bank will call the carrying 
amount due.  Lending institutions understand that there could be genuine reasons for which the 
borrower is unable to make timely payments such as loss of job, or an accident that may have 
confined the borrower to bed.  Thus, instead of running away from the banks, borrowers need to 
engage in a dialogue with the bank.  Based on how genuine the borrowers’ intent and case is, the 
bank may look for feasible solutions like restructuring debt or rescheduling the debt. 
 
• The National Credit Act of 2005 which came into operation on June 2007 gives a consumer 
the right to apply for a debt review, to be declared over-indebted after his financial position 
has been evaluated, and to have his debts rescheduled.  The consumer applies through a debt 
counsellor registered with the National Credit Regulator (NCR), the regulatory body of all 
15 
 
debt counsellors.  Debt rescheduling can occur by extending the period on the contract; this 
will bring down the monthly instalments commitment, though it will result to more interest 
payments in the long term.  Another form of debt rescheduling is deferring the payment by 
seeking temporary relief from the bank for a few months; this may result to penalty charges 
for not paying within the time frames agreed upon earlier.  Should the borrowers financial 
situation improve, the borrower can negotiate with the bank and revert to the old or higher 
monthly instalments or even prepay the loan, closing it early and saving excessive interest 
payments.  Although rescheduling debt is a consumers right, the consumer may not apply for 
a debt review in respect of a particular credit agreement if the credit provider has already 
taken steps to enforce foreclosure.  By 31 March 2010, the National Credit Regulator had 
registered 1 642 debt counsellors.  The number of applications for debt counselling 
continued to grow during the period with between 7 000 and 8 000 new applications per 
month, reaching 161 749 applications at the end of the period, (Roestoff, Haupt, and 
Erasmus 2009).  This statistics are proof of the over indebtedness of South African 
households. 
• Borrowers can also consider restructuring the loan facility.  Unlike the debt counselling   
option, debt restructuring is done directly with a bank and not through a debt counsellor who 
acts as an intermediary.  However, defaulted clients do not automatically qualify for 
restructuring.  The option to restructure is at the bank’s discretion and a loan should possess 
certain qualities to qualify for a restructuring.  These include factors like whether the client is 
making some form of payment or not.  A client in a restructure is not removed from default 
but kept in default for a certain period of time while the bank monitors the consistency of 
payments.  After a series of perpetual payments and commitment to the restructure 
arrangements, the bank then decides to take the client out of the 90 days past due to the 
current bucket, that is 0 - 30 days past due.  
 
Based on the above discussions, a borrower may benefit from debt counselling and loan restructuring 
through retaining the asset, and the bank may also benefit because the revised agreements leads to a 
lower defaulted portfolio over time and prevents foreclosure.  Standard Bank offers the EasySell 
programme, which is designed to help one sell your property in order to avoid foreclosure.  Nedbank 
has a similar programme called the Nedbank Assisted Sales programme, where the bank uses estate 
agents to market and sell property.  Similarly, FNB has a Quick Sell programme to help consumers 
who are over-indebted that their only option is to sell their properties for the best price they can 
obtain.  If a borrower opts for Quick Sell but receives insufficient funds to cover what one owes the 
bank, FNB may provide a discount of up to 20 percent on your pre-sale outstanding loan amount.  
The discount depends on the extent of your arrears when you applied for Quick Sell.  Absa also 
introduced a programme called Help you sell, where the bank assists the borrower to market the 
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property through estate agencies or auctioneers.  According to Lightstone, a company that researches 
the property market, the number of sales in execution has dropped significantly as a result of the 
bank’s interventions to help distressed homeowners. 
 
From the above discussions, it evident that there are other options available to lenders besides 
foreclosure to recover losses on default loans and it can take a substantial period of time to complete 
a foreclosure.  However, if the borrower refuses to communicate with the bank and avoids any 
interaction with the bank to an extent that the bank does not get tangible commitment on payments, 
the bank servicers will typically start foreclosure proceedings.   
 
Hayre, Saraf, Young, and Chen (2008) define foreclosure as a legal process, by which the property 
that serves as collateral on the loan is sold.  Foreclosure occurs when the borrower defaults on the 
contractual obligations of the loan, usually by failing to meet the required capital or interest 
payments.  Through the foreclosure process, the lender exercises his power to sell the property.  
Judgement for the amount due must first be obtained to serve as a basis for a writ of execution for a 
judicial sale.   
 
Before or during the foreclosure process, the Bank may encourage the borrower to sell the property, 
even if the selling price is less than the mortgage amount.  The mortgage lender may insist on a 
reserve price to protect his or her interests.  The bank may also buy the property at the sale and set 
off the amount due under the mortgage against the purchase price.  The proceeds can be used to 
satisfy the claim.  If the servicer takes possession of the property, property is then classified as a 
Property in Possession.  At this point, the lender may either tenant the property, with rental streams 
accruing to it, or sell the property by either private treaty or public auction.  Banks usually take time 
to foreclose as this is an expensive exercise.  When a lender forecloses on a property, significant 
costs arise.  
Default risk on a residential mortgage loan is often in terms of any negative equity in the property at 
the time of default.  The actual loss on a defaulted loan is however much greater than the negative 
equity.  When a lender forecloses on a property, significant costs arise.  Claurentie and Sirmans 
(2003) grouped the costs of foreclosing and liquidating properties into three categories namely; 
transaction costs, property costs and opportunity costs.  Transaction costs include those involved 
with the foreclosure; attorneys’ fees, trustees fees, sheriffs cost of sale, brokers commission and title 
charges.  Property costs include those fees incurred by the lender to carry the property until 
liquidated: property taxes, hazard insurance, utilities, and repairs and maintenance.  Opportunity 
costs include interest foregone on the investment value of the property.  
Thus it appears that the cost of default comes not only from a decline in property prices that might 
produce negative equity, but also from the cost of the foreclosure and property liquidation process.  
17 
 
 3.3 Theoretical review 
This literature review explores research from different authors who analyse the factors that explain 
movements in residential delinquency rates and default rates.  Early studies on mortgage default 
amongst others include the studies by Herzog and Earley (1970), Campbell and Dietrich (1983).  
While this thesis aims to examine the relationship between delinquency rates and macroeconomic 
variables, earlier studies by Herzog and Earley (1970) and Campbell and Dietrich (1983) focused on 
loan, borrower and property characteristics as determinants of past due loans.  
 
Herzog and Earley (1970) used twelve independent variables to explain variation in delinquency risk 
namely; (1) loan purpose, (2) the presence and absence of junior financing, (3) loan-to-value ratio, 
(4) loan type, (5) initial term to maturity, (6) monthly mortgage payment to borrower income ratio, 
(7) borrower occupation, (8) marital status, (9) number of dependents, (10) geographical region, (11) 
borrower age, and (12) type of lender .  To ascertain the influence of these variables, the authors 
classified the loans as being current (no payments missed), delinquent (ninety days or more) and in 
foreclosure.  Using the loan status as the dependant variable, the authors then developed a linear 
probability function  where the dependant variable, loan status was assigned a value of zero if loan 
was in current status, and a value of one if it was either ninety or more days delinquent or in 
foreclosure.  In cases where negative values or values greater than 1 arise, Herzog and Earley (1970) 
argue that it is not possible to assign a probability interpretation to them.  Therefore the authors 
chose to call the regression functions risk equations and to call the results of these equations risk 
indices.  Herzog and Earley (1970) further stated that if equations have good discriminating power, 
lower values for the results demonstrate low risk while high values indicate high risk.  The analysis 
was performed on separate samples of loans sourced from the United States Savings and Loan 
League (USSLL), the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) and the National Association of Mutual 
Savings  banks (NAMSB).   
The general regression equation was as follows: 
 
 Ra= a1 + a2RLS + a3T  + a3RPI  + Oi + DNi  + SMi + ABi  + Pi  + FJ + TLDi + TLN +Ri+ et                                            (1) 
 
where the variables with subscripts are used to show the presence of two or more dummy classes and 
symbols are defined as follows:   (RLS) loan to value ratio; (T) term to maturity, (RPI) monthly 
payment to income ratio; (O) borrower occupation; (DN) number of dependants; (SM) is marital 
status; (AB) borrower age; (P) loan purpose; (FJ) indicates the presence and absence of junior 
financing; (TLD) type of lender; (TLN)  type of loan; and (R) region.  
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Herzog and Earley (1970) claimed that due to scarcity of data and other technical issues it was not 
possible to include variables which contained more than a few dummy variables.  Instead of using all 
variables, the indices were based on the five variables including RLS, T, P, FJ, and RPI. 
The regression results of risk indices for delinquency risk, foreclosure risk, and straight foreclosure 
risk are given in table 11 of Appendix A. 
 
The authors found borrowing for refinancing purposes and the presence of junior financing to be the 
most important variable affecting the incidence of serious loan delinquency.  Refinancing is the 
process of acquiring new loans to pay off an existing loan.  Junior financing is a class of debt that, in 
the event of insolvency, is prioritized lower than other classes of debt. 
At a significance level of one percent, the loan to value was found to have a positive and significant 
influence on delinquency risk in loan statuses.  However, the term of maturity showed a negative 
relationship in all three loan statuses and was statistically significant in only four of six equations.  
Term to maturity is the time remaining before a contract expires.  The longer the term, the higher the 
chances of the loan becoming delinquent.  Occupation was found to be significant.  The authors 
stated that in general, professional persons, executives, and managers showed the least delinquency 
and self-employed persons and salesmen the most.  The variable region proved to be significant in 
determining variation in delinquency risk.  The study therefore showed differences amongst the 
regions.  Loan type was also a significant variable.  The number of dependants showed a positive 
significant relationship for the USSLL sample and was insignificant in the MBA and NAMSB 
samples. 
The mortgage payment-to-borrower income variable was found not to have a significant relationship 
for delinquency risks.  Herzog and Earley (1970) explain that this occurred because both lenders and 
borrowers watch this ratio carefully.  The authors added that lenders and borrowers avoid situations 
where the ratios exceed critical limits unless there is assurance that payments will be made from non 
income sources.  In addition, the study revealed that most loans within the observed samples had 
mortgage payment-to-borrower income ratios below 25 percent.  Marital status was found not to be 
statistically significant in all samples; however the risk coefficients were uniformly lower for 
married than for single borrowers.  Borrower age showed mixed results, so no generalisation was 
justified. 
 
According to Campbell and Dietrich (1983) a default occurrence is based on an optimization model 
of consumer choice.  The authors claim that, at each point in time of the life of a mortgage, 
borrowers observe a set of state variables and choose one of four utility maximizing actions;  default, 
delay payment, prepayment, or continue to pay mortgages.   
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The authors assume that the utility maximizing choice can be represented as a probability function of 
the state variables given as follows; 
                                                                      P (si I x) = fi(x)                                                                                                (2)                
where the sum of the probabilities of all n elements in s for a given x is equal to unity;  
�  P (Si  I x)  =  1𝑛
𝑡=1
; and si represents the ith choice variable of the representative borrower.   
Thus Campbell and Dietrich (1983) estimate a multinomial logit using regional aggregates 
constructed from cross sectional and time series data.  The time series data included the index of 
mean housing prices for new and existing single family dwellings, the index of nominal disposable 
income, the rate of unemployment, and the current mortgage rate in the region.  Cross sectional data 
included current loan to value, age of mortgage and a dummy variable which assumes a value of 1 
when a home is new, 0 otherwise. 
 
Campbell and Dietrich (1983) quoting a study by McFadden (1973) show that under a reasonable set 
of assumptions, the consumer's choice can be described by a logit function.  For default, delinquent 
and prepay, the logit function is given as follows;                            Pi =  eβi     / (1+  e –β1X    +  e –β2X   +  e –β3X   )                                                                                     (3) 
The logit function for continuing to make payments is given as follows;                          P4 = 1/  (1+  e –β1X    +  e –β2X   +  e –β3X   )                           (4) 
Where β1 represents a vector of coefficients relating the probability of choice i to the variables in X. 
Combining equations (3) and (4) the following is obtained;                          Pi /P4 =  e –β1X                                                                                                                                        (5) 
Transforming equations (5) into a linear log equation gives;                        Log(Pi /P4) =  e –β1X                                                                                                                                (6) 
The authors used the weighted least squares method procedure to estimate the regression model.  The 
general regression equations are stated below: 
                           LPDEF= a1 + a2CLTV + a3CPTY  + a4UNEM  + a5CROR +a6 DUMNEW  + a7DUM85 + a8DUM90  + a9DUM95 + et                   (7)    LPDEL= b1 + b2CLTV + b3CPTY  + b4UNEM  + b5CROR + b6 DUMNEW  + b7DUM85 + b8DUM90  + b9DUM95 + et                 (8)    LPPRE= c1 + c2CLTV + c3CPTY  + c4UNEM  + c5CROR +c6 DUMNEW  + c7DUM85 + c8DUM90  + c9DUM95 + et                     (9)    LPDEFa= d1 + d2CLTV + d3CPTY  + d4UNEM  + d5CROR +d6 DUMNEW  + d7DUM85 + d8DUM90  + d9DUM95 +d10Age + d11Age2 +et            (10)    LPDELa= f1 + f2CLTV + f3CPTY  +f4UNEM  + f5CROR + f6DUMNEW  + f7DUM85 + f8DUM90  + f9DUM95 + f10Age + f11Age2+et                       (11)    LPPREa= g1 + g2CLTV + g3CPTY  + g3UNEM  + g4CROR +g5 DUMNEW  + g6DUM85 + g7DUM90  + g8DUM95 + g9Age + g10Age2 +et             (12) 
 
where dependent variables with subscripts are used to show the presence of age variables, the other 
variables are defined as follows:   (LPDEF) log of probability of default in a given year; (LPDEL) 
log probability of delinquency in a given year; (LPPRE) log of probability of prepayment and/or 
insurance cancellation in a given year; (CLTV) current loan-to-value ratio; (CPTY) current payment-
to-income ratio;  (UNEM)  rate of unemployment; (CROR) ratio of the current mortgage rate to 
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contract rate on the mortgage at the beginning of a year;  (AGE ) age of the mortgage at the 
beginning of a year; (AGESQ)  age of the mortgage squared;  (DUMNEW) a dummy variable which 
assumes a value of 1 when a home is new, 0 otherwise; (DUM80)  a dummy variable which assumes 
the value of 1 if a loan has an initial loan-to-value ratio less than or equal to 80%, 0 otherwise. The 
variables (DUM85), (DUM90), and (DUM95) have a similar interpretation.   
 
Following correlation results showing strong collinearity between age and household monthly 
income; a total of six models were estimated.  Three models show regression results when the age 
variables are omitted while the other three models show results with the age variables included.  The 
regression results with the t statistics are provided in table 12 of Appendix A. 
The regression results suggest that the loan-to-value ratio, the unemployment rate, the age of the 
mortgage and ratio of current to original mortgage rate all have negative effects (significant at 1 
percent level). 
 
More recent studies on mortgage delinquencies include Rebelo and Vaz Caldas (2010) and Brent et 
al., (2011). 
Brent et al., (2011) examine mortgage delinquency rates for loans in each state and Washington, DC 
from 2004 through to 2009.  Like Herzog and Earley (1970), models are estimated for different 
delinquency buckets including, 30 day, 60 day, 90 day, and  90 plus days delinquency rates.  
However, Brent et al., (2011) calculate a delinquency rate for each delinquent bucket instead of using 
a linear probability function.  The authors’ extend the work of Herzog and Earley (1970) by further 
categorizing data by prime and subprime loans to capture differences in the performance of these 
loans, and by introducing new independent variables including borrower race, adjustable rate 
mortgages, no-income verification, a house price  index and unemployment.  The models use 
independent variables that represent: 1) borrower characteristics; 2) loan characteristics; and 3) 
economic conditions and shocks to income to explain variation in Y, which represent the degree of 
delinquency.  The authors use a two-way fixed effects model to examine cross-sectional time series 
data on mortgage delinquency rates in the US. 
 
The general regression equation estimated by Brent et al., (2011) is given below: 
 
Dr=  β1 +  β2whpet +  β3blpct  +  β3hispct + β4asnpct + β5ntvpet + β6fempct +  β7credscr + β8income  + β9nonoccp +  β10nivst    
   + β11spread + β12pctrefi +  β13lien2nd + β14pctadj+ β15depct +  β16unempl + β17numpermt  + β18hpidx +  β19prbusvc  +  et                             (13) 
 
where Dr  represents the delinquency rate for each loan class and variables are defined as follows: (whpet) white borrowers;(blpct) African American borrowers; (hispct) Hispanic borrowers; (asnpct) 
Asian borrowers;(ntvpet) Native American borrowers; (fempct) female borrowers; (credscr) credit 
score; (income) personal income; (nonoccp) non-owner occupied loans; (pctadj) adjustable rate 
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loans;(depct ) denial rate; (unempl) unemployment rate; (numpermt) number of building permits; 
(hpidx) house price index; and (prbusvc) growth rate of persons employed in professional and 
business services.  The authors estimated six models; the regression results of the estimated models, 
with standard errors are given in tables 13 through to table 15 of Appendix A. 
 
The findings suggest that factors that determine 30 and 60 day delinquency rates differ from those 
that determine 90 day and 90 plus day delinquency rates.  Borrower income was found to have a 
significant negative influence on delinquency rates.  Brent et al., (2011) found that income reduces 
all delinquency rates for prime borrowers, except 30-day delinquency rates.  Amongst the loan 
characteristics, the variables no-income verification, refinance loans and adjustable rate mortgages 
were found to be statistically significant.  The findings relating to the refinance loans independent 
variable are consistent with findings by Herzog and Earley (1970).  Refinance entails paying off an 
existing loan using proceeds from a new loan.  No-income verification loans reduce delinquency 
rates, while adjustable rate mortgages increase 90-day delinquency rates for prime loans and 90 plus 
day delinquency rates for prime and subprime loans.  The authors stated that no-income verification 
loans are primarily approved for borrowers with very high credit scores and sizeable down payments.   
Refinance loans increase 30-day and 60-day delinquency rates and reduce 90-day and 90 plus day 
delinquency rates.  When considering the results for economic conditions, growth in the house price 
index was found to reduce delinquency rates.  Unemployment and denials proved to increase all 
delinquency rates, except 30-day delinquency rates.  The variable denials refer to application denial 
rates, increased denial rates are increased applications from less credit worthy borrowers.  However, 
borrower race does not consistently explain delinquency rates.  
 
Unlike Herzog and Earley (1970) and Brent et al., (2011), Rebelo and Vaz Caldas (2010) use an 
ordered probit model to estimate the influence of credit, social and economic variables on the 
probabilities of mortgage default in Portuguese households.  Rebelo and Caldas (2010) estimate four 
models where the dependant variable takes one of four values depending on the degree of 
delinquency.  (Y = 0) represents delayed and one month overdue instalments; (Y = 1) represents two 
month overdue instalments; (Y = 2) includes pre-litigation, three overdue instalments; lastly (Y = 3) 
includes clients in litigation and over three overdue instalments.  According to Rebelo and Vaz 
Caldas (2010), the multinomial logit which allows for more than two categories suffers from the 
“independence of irrelevant alternatives” assumption.  To address this issue the authors add that the 
order probit allows the dependent variables to assume values which are ordinal or ranking.  The 
authors define the general regression equation as follows: 
 
𝑦 = 𝑓 ( 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, 𝑥4, 𝑥5, 𝑥6, 𝑥7, 𝑥8, 𝑥9, 𝑥10) +  𝑒                                                                                     (14) 
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where e represents the statistical error and variables are: age (𝑥1), marital status (𝑥2), job contract 
(𝑥3), education level (𝑥4), place of residence (𝑥5), household size (𝑥6), household monthly income 
(𝑥7), monthly net income per capita, number of banking loans (𝑥8),  effort rate (𝑥9), and  loan 
guarantee  (𝑥10). 
 
Following correlation results showing a significant linear association between household size and 
household monthly income,   the authors estimated four ordered probit regression models.  Model 1 
included socio-economic variables 𝑥1,  𝑥2, 𝑥3, 𝑥4, and 𝑥5 as well as 𝑥6 and 𝑥7.  Model 2 included 
model 1 variables and additional bank involvement variables 𝑥8, 𝑥9 and 𝑥10. Model 3 included social-
economic variables as per model 1 but replacing 𝑥6  and 𝑥7 with 𝑥7a = 𝑥7𝑥6 (per capita income).  Model 
4 included model 3 variables with the addition of bank involvement variables 𝑥8, 𝑥9 and 𝑥10.  The 
regression results of the four estimated probit models, with standard errors are given in table 16 of 
Appendix A. 
According to Rebelo and Vaz Caldas (2010), the loan capacity related variables namely number of 
banking loans, financial effort rate, and the ratio between loan amount and guarantee or real estate 
value influence the ranking of default probabilities.  However, regarding the social and economic 
variables, only dummies, such as marital status, place of residence, family size, and monthly income 
were relevant.  The type of job contract as well as qualifications do not influence default 
probabilities while age only influences default probabilities associated with more than 3 overdue 
instalments.  The findings relating to occupation, marital status proved to be inconsistent to earlier 
studies by Herzog and Earley, while findings pertaining to place of residence, age, monthly income 
where in line with earlier findings.   
 
Based on the above literature review, it is possible to summarize that determinants of defaults on a 
mortgage loans are related to household socio-economic and behavioural characteristics as well as to 
the external or macroeconomic environment.   
 
However, this thesis models the default rates for South African loans for the period 2006 through to 
2010 using only macroeconomic variables.  As mentioned earlier, this study estimates four models 
using data from a big bank in South Africa (models 1, 2 and 3) and published aggregated data model 
4.  Data from a big bank in South Africa was used to estimate models   for 30 day, 60 day, and 90 
plus day delinquent loans, while published aggregated data was used to model 90 plus day in 
delinquency mortgage loans for the big four banks.  
 
3.4 Research Hypothesis 
Mortgage delinquency rates and default rates are driven primarily by how households are tied to 
business cycles.  Increases in prime interest rates lead to increases in mortgage payments and could 
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constrain the liquidity of borrowers.  As prices of consumables including transport costs and food 
prices increase, consumers tend to enter into arrears in the bond repayments to meet basic needs.  
Increasing unemployment rates result in negative shocks to income that impact on borrower's ability 
to pay a mortgage.  Decreasing house prices impair the borrower's equity position, which in turn 
increases delinquency risk because homeowners are in a worse position to refinance or sell if a 
trigger event occurs.  The greater the proportion of the borrower's income that goes toward making 
debt payments, the greater the strain a trigger event puts on the borrower's ability to continue making 
mortgage payments.  Excessive borrowing leads to over indebtedness and thus default. 
Based on the above, the hypothesis statement is formulated as follows:  
 
Depressed economic conditions including high interest rates, high inflation, high 
unemployment, and low real estate prices, high debt to income ratios impair home owner’s 
ability to meet contractual monthly mortgage payments and may lead to default.  The 
aforementioned tough economic conditions are generally unpredictable negative shocks 
which reduce the consumers’ income.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
 
 
 
This chapter offers a brief description of the research population, research sample and research 
methodology. 
 
4.1 The research population 
The population of the study is defined as all residential mortgage loans and advances underwritten by 
the South African retail banking sector.  
 
4.2 The research sample 
Separate samples of loans were obtained from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) and from 
one of the four big South African banks.  For confidentiality reasons, the name of the bank is not 
disclosed.  The four banks contributed 84, 6 percent to the balance-sheet size of the banking sector at 
December 2010, with loans and advances accounting 74 percent of these assets and, residential 
mortgages accounting 35,3 percent of loans and advances.  (South African Reserve Bank 
Supervision Annual Report 2010). Specifically, of the 35, 3 percent in residential mortgages, 
Standard bank has the largest portfolio of residential mortgages at 34 percent followed by ABSA, 
FirstRand and Nedbank at 30 percent, 18 percent, and 17 percent respectively.   
 
4.3 Data Analysis  
Monthly data concerning current, past due and foreclosed mortgages were gathered from one of the 
big four banks in South Africa.  The sample period was January 2005 until December 2010.  The 
default rates data is aggregated data of the big four banks, extracted from the South African Reserve 
Bank Annual Report for the period between January 2008 and December 2010.  The start period 
January 2008 was selected to ensure consistency in the data due to the introduction of the Basel 2 
regulatory framework, details are as follows:  
 
i. Prior to 2008, the big four South African banks measured their credit risk using the Standardised 
Approach.  Under this approach, credit risk exposures are classified as either “standard,” “special 
mention,” “substandard”, “doubtful” or “loss.”  Specifically, defaulted advances included 
accounts classified as “substandard,” “doubtful” or “loss.”  However, on 1 January 2008, the big 
four banks adopted the Advanced Internal Ratings-Based (AIRB) approach for the calculation of 
the minimum capital requirement for credit risk.  Under the AIRB approach credit exposures are 
classified as either “current,” “30 days in arrears”, “60 days in arrears” or “90 plus days in 
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arrears”, where the latter classification represent defaulted advances.  The impact of the 
amendment to the definition of overdue accounts is not discussed in this paper. 
ii. The classification of loans and advances types was narrow under the Standardised approach and 
consisted of few loan categories.  Loans and advances were classified as either “mortgage 
loans,” “instalment sales and leases,” “and “other loans and advances,” where mortgages loans 
included farm loans, residential mortgages, and commercial mortgages.   
iii. Lastly, the credit exposure under the Standardised approach included both the on-balance sheet 
exposure and off-balance sheet exposure.  Off-balance sheet refer to exposure where the 
borrower has not utilised the exposure although the credit has been granted.  However, the 
impact of the above mentioned issues on data is not discussed in this report. 
 
The choice of macroeconomic variables used in the study was motivated by Herzog and Earley 
(1970), Brent et al., (2011), and Rebelo and Vaz Caldas (2010). 
The data for prime interest rates, the Absa house price index, and the consumer price index were 
extracted from Reuters, while the data for debt to income ratio, credit growth, and unemployment 
were sourced from Statistics South Africa.   
All variables were computed by indexing1 the variable being either a number or a percentage.  Since 
we would not expect variation in any dependent variable to add a constant amount to delinquencies 
or default rate, rather, variations in a dependent variable influence delinquencies by a constant 
percentage.  For ease of interpretation of regression coefficients, the variables where then 
transformed by taking logarithms2 of the indexed number or percentage.  Following the logarithm 
transformation, the log linear regression model is expressed as a follows;  
                     ln yt = β1 +β2 lnx2+…. +βnlnxn+ et                                                                                                                                              (15) 
 
where,  β2 ... βn are partial slope coefficients3.  Each partial slope coefficient measures the partial 
elasticity of the dependant variable with respect to the explanatory variable in question, holding all 
other variables constant. 
A trend analysis showing the original and transformed data for each independent variable is provided 
in the paragraphs that follow.  Figure 7 shows delinquency rates and default rates for loans classified 
as 30-day, 60-day and 90-day past due between 2005 and 2010.  Delinquency rates were at their 
lowest towards the final quarter of 2005.  As the recession became evident in 2009, 30 day 
                                                     
1 Such that V1 = 100,  Vt = (Vt-1* Vt)/ Vt-1, where V1 = value (balance or percentage) at month 1 and Vt is value at t 
2 Such that ln (𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑡) = 𝐷𝑡               
3 Such that the partial derivative of ln Y with respect to ln X is  βn = 
𝛿 ln 𝑌 
𝛿 ln 𝑋𝑛
 = 𝛿 Y/ 𝑌 
𝛿 𝑋𝑛/ 𝑋𝑛 =  𝛿 𝑌   𝛿 𝑋𝑛       . 𝑋𝑛 𝑌       
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delinquency rates rose to a high of 4 percent as new clients were migrating from performing to 
delinquent.  By the end 2009, the 90 days delinquency rates had increased to 13 percent. 
Figure 8 shows the same delinquency and default rates using transformed data.  The original ratios 
and transformed ratios exhibit similar trends over the sample period.   
 
Figure 9 shows aggregated delinquency and default rates for residential mortgage loans between the 
periods 2008 and 2010.  During the sample period, default rates showed an increasing trend, 
increasing from 2.67 percent in January 2005 to 8.67 percent in December 2010, a 225 percent 
increase.  However, default ratios flattened between the final quarters of 2009 and 2010.   
 
Figure 7: 30 day, 60 day, and 90 day delinquency rates 
 
 
Figure 8: Transformed 30 day, 60 day, and 90 day delinquency rates 
 
 
Figure 9: Default rates for aggregated data 
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Figure 10 captures the prime interest rates.  Prime interest rates are interest rates changes linked to 
the repo rate.  Prime interest rates at 10, 5 percent were at their highest at December 2008, and 
showed a decreasing trend in the last quarter of 2010. 
Figure 11 captures the debt to income ratio (DTI) ratio.  The debt to income ratio (DTI) is the ratio of 
mortgage payments and other debt payments to income of the borrower.  The debt-to-income ratio 
reached a high of 82, 0 percent in the March 2008 and trended gradually downwards to 77, 6 percent 
in December 2010. 
 
Figure 12 captures credit growth.  The variable credit growth is the value total mortgages credit 
extended to households including residential mortgages.  
 
Figure 13 captures the consumer price index (CPI).  The CPI is the official measure of inflation in 
South Africa.  From 2005 until 2010, the average inflation rate in South Africa was 5.2 percent, 
reached a high of 13.50 percent in August 2008 and a low of 1.5 percent in September 2010.  
 
Figure 14 captures the Absa House Price Index.  This index provides a measure of typical price 
inflation for houses issued by Absa.  Nominal house deflation averaged 2, 9 percent in 2009.  
However, house prices peaked around mid-year and slowed down significantly to an average of 2, 6 
percent year on year in the second half of 2010.  
 
Figure 15 captures unemployment.  The number of unemployed individuals showed an increasing 
trend since September 2007, however declined in September 2008. 
 
Figure 10: Prime interest rates 2006 - 2010 
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Figure 11: Debt to income ratio 2006 - 2010 
 
Figure 12: Credit growth: loans and advances 2006 – 2010 
 
Figure 13: CPI 2006 – 2010 
 
 
Figure 14: Absa house price index 2006 - 2010 
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Figure 15: Unemployment 2006 – 2010 
 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the data including sample mean, standard deviation, 
minimum, and maximum values of the dependent variables and independent variables in the 
regression. 
 
Table 1: The descriptive statistics for the data 
 
 
We use the E-views statistical package to analyse the data.  Tables 2 and 3 present the correlation 
coefficient between delinquency rates and the macroeconomic variables for the two samples, the 
undisclosed bank data, and SARB aggregated bank data. 
 
Table 2: Correlation matrix (Aggregated bank data) 
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30 days 
delinquent
60 days 
delinquent
90 days 
delinquent
Aggregated 
default ratios
Prime HPI Unemplo
yment
Debt-to-
income
CPI Credit 
Growth
Mean 108.6747518 142.7506106 146.9958007 0.071524617 111.171 143.6871 91.2568 130.469 325.8945 394.7425
Standard Error 3.577150862 6.340455733 11.64945234 0.003458673 2.331921 1.516474 0.63265 0.870284 24.48597 8.607002
Median 103.3682944 130.4967757 112.5263371 0.084428665 113.6364 146.3455 90.56604 132.4459 266.6667 434.3153
Mode #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A 113.6364 #N/A 100 136.4393 188.8889 #N/A
Standard Deviation 27.47661713 48.70196459 89.48114131 0.020752036 17.91183 11.64825 4.859476 6.684778 188.0803 66.11163
Sample Variance 754.964489 2371.881355 8006.87465 0.000430647 320.8336 135.6818 23.6145 44.68625 35374.21 4370.748
Kurtosis -0.554180914 -0.316476046 -1.741087529 -0.749886493 -1.23226 -0.12881 -0.88771 0.552021 -0.39309 -0.86619
Skewness 0.638497122 0.734442292 0.287591756 -0.886864918 0.361315 -0.76347 0.245867 -1.22298 0.872988 -0.79121
Range 99.57186616 173.3505158 220.2095774 0.063301396 59.09091 44.30421 17.35849 23.62729 666.6667 207.7608
Minimum 69.09018098 77.10630436 49.57095511 0.026681832 81.81818 116.7983 82.64151 112.812 83.33333 256.1794
Maximum 168.6620471 250.4568202 269.7805325 0.089983228 140.9091 161.1025 100 136.4393 750 463.9402
Sum 6411.810355 8422.286025 8672.752239 2.574886214 6559.091 8477.537 5384.151 7697.671 19227.78 23289.81
Count 59 59 59 36 59 59 59 59 59 59
Descriptive Statistics
DRATIO CPI DINCOME ABSAHP CREDIT EMPLO PRIME
DRATIO 1.0000
CPI 0.9486 1.0000
DINCOME 0.5867 0.7000 1.0000
ABSAHP 0.4551 0.6503 0.7356 1.0000
CREDIT 0.8596 0.8521 0.3128 0.3440 1.0000
EMPLO -0.0445 0.1544 0.2106 0.7037 0.0071 1.0000
PRIME -0.8214 -0.9090 -0.7865 -0.6574 -0.6072 -0.1427 1.0000
Correlation Matrix
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Table 3: Correlation matrix (Undisclosed bank) 
 
 
4.4 Econometric Methodology 
 
4.4.1   Univariate characteristics of data 
 
The report uses the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model to estimate the influence of 
macroeconomic factors on mortgage delinquencies.  The OLS methodology was chosen as an 
estimator because it is linear, unbiased, and has a minimum variance amongst all linear unbiased 
estimators of a parameter.  From the data provided the OLS regression estimate is given as follows:                          Yt = β1 +β2x2+…. +βnxn+ et                                 (16) 
where yt  represents the dependent variable, β 1  is the constant,  β n is the slope of coefficients, and Xn 
the explanatory variables macroeconomic variables and et   are the residuals which are independent 
and identically distributed random variables with  E[et ]= 0 and E[e2t ]= σ2 e  .  
 
Defaulting on a mortgage represents the ultimate consequence of past decisions to delay payment.  
As such, a better understanding of the probability of default is obtainable from better understanding 
the probability of delinquency that is induced by the sequence.  A total of four OLS models were 
then run using the different loan delinquency statuses as the dependent variable.  The mortgage 
delinquency statuses include 30 days, 60 days, and 90 days delinquent loans.  The last model uses 
SARB aggregated data to estimate default risk using the ratio of default to mortgage loans as the 
dependent variable.  
The choice of macroeconomic variables used in the study was motivated by studies by Herzog 
and Earley (1970), Brent et al., (2011), and Rebelo and Vaz Caldas (2010).  These include 
employment, debt to income ratio, inflation, credit growth, house prices, and prime interest rates.  
Early studies by Herzog and Earley (1970) suggest employment determines a mortgage delinquency 
status.  The findings may suggest that declining employment rates result in negative shocks to 
income that impact on borrower's ability to pay a mortgage.  Therefore, employment rate and 
mortgage default rate should be inversely related.  
The debt to income ratio (DTI) is the ratio of the monthly mortgage payments and other debt 
payments to the monthly income of the borrower.  The higher the DTI ratio, the greater the 
30 days 
delinquent
60 days 
delinquent
90 days 
delinquent
Prime HPI Unemplo
yment
Debt-to-
income
CPI Credit 
Growth
30 days delinquent 1
60 days delinquent 0.730844886 1
90 days delinquent 0.241255167 0.758668973 1
Prime 0.743076661 0.154391991 -0.368541261 1
HPI 0.395189853 0.550215512 0.733793682 0.063956 1
Unemployment -0.74834694 -0.419396402 -0.013556903 -0.67686 -0.39589 1
Debt-to-income 0.763193156 0.688493589 0.488150495 0.509507 0.801089 -0.71722 1
CPI 0.858779641 0.424395736 -0.009288872 0.877536 0.279112 -0.6552 0.663011 1
Credit Growth 0.597814499 0.748323388 0.781552498 0.164891 0.911921 -0.44832 0.864156 0.429477 1
Correlation matrix
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proportion of the borrower's income that goes toward making debt payments, and hence the greater 
the strain a trigger event puts on the borrower's ability to continue making mortgage payments.  Thus 
debt to income ratio should be directly related to mortgage delinquency and default ratio. 
Another factor that determines delinquency status and default risk is inflation which is measured by 
the consumer price index.  As prices of consumables including transport costs and food prices 
increase, consumers tend to enter into arrears in the bond repayments to meet basic needs.   
The variable credit growth is the annual percentage change in overall credit extended to households 
including residential mortgages.  This variable is expected to have a negative relationship with the 30 
days delinquent rates.  This relationship may signify that borrowers acquire new credit facilities like 
overdrafts and credit cards to reduce their mortgage debt to keep their accounts in current.  Thus they 
acquire additional credit to pay off existing credit.  Borrowers may benefit from the credit relief in 
short term; however, over time excessive borrowing will lead to over indebtedness and thus default.  
Thus the same variable is expected to have a significant positive relationship with defaulted loans.  
Increases in house prices improve the borrower's equity position, which in turn reduces delinquency 
risk because homeowners are in a better position to refinance or sell if a trigger event occurs. 
The final determinant of delinquency status and default rate included in the model specification is the 
prime interest rate.  Prime interest rates are interest rates changes linked to the repo rate.  The 
variable is expected to have a significant negative influence on default risk.  Jumps in prime interest 
rates lead to increases in mortgage payments and could constrain the liquidity of borrowers. 
The hypothesized relationship between each of the five independent variables and the independent 
variables is summarized in Table 4.   
 
Table 4: Independent variables and direction of influence 
 
Regression models involving time series data sometimes give results that are spurious or of dubious 
value, in the sense that superficially the results look good but on further investigation they look 
suspect.  In addition, an OLS model provides unreliable estimators when variables are non-
stationary.  It is thus important to test for stationarity in time series data.  Stationary models can yield 
time series plots that closely resemble those from non-stationary models having a stochastic trend.  
(Koop, 2006, p148).  Therefore looking at time series plots alone is not enough to tell whether a 
series has a unit root.  Given an AR (p) model,  𝛥𝑌𝑡 =   ⍺𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑥𝑡′𝜑 +   β1 𝛥𝑌𝑡−1 +  β2 𝛥𝑌𝑡−2 +. . . + βp  ΔY t−p +  𝑣𝑡,   
Independent Variable
Direct (+) Inverse (-)
CPI ●
Debt to income ratio ●
House prices ●
Credit growth (short term effect) ●
Credit growth (long term effect) ●
Unemployment ●
Prime interest rates ●
Direction of Influence
Direction of Influence
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(Koop, 2006) suggests the following as ways of identifying whether a time series variable, Y, is 
stationary or has a unit root: 
 
In the AR (p) model, if ⍺ = 1, then Y has a unit root.  If | ⍺ | < 1 then Y is stationary. 
If Y has a unit root then its autocorrelations will be near one and will not drop much as lag 
length increases. 
If Y has a unit root, then it will have a long memory.  Stationary time series do not have long 
memory. 
If Y has a unit root then the series will exhibit trend behaviour (especially if a is non-zero). 
If Y has a unit root, then ΔY will be stationary.  For this reason, series with unit roots are 
often referred to as difference stationary series. 
Thus, the hypothesis of stationarity can be evaluated by testing whether the absolute value of  ⍺ is 
strictly less than one.  The null and alternative hypotheses may be written as; 
𝐻0 : ⍺ = 0                                                                                    𝐻1 : ⍺ < 0                       (17) 
 
and evaluated using the t statistic for  ⍺: 
                                                                     𝑡⍺ =   ⍺/(𝑠𝑒(𝛼))       (18) 
 
where, α^ is the estimate of α, and 𝑠𝑒(𝛼^) is the coefficient standard error.  If the variables in the 
distributed lag model are stationary, then OLS estimates are reliable and the statistical techniques of 
multiple regressions (e.g. looking at P-values or confidence intervals) can be used in a 
straightforward manner.  Using the E-views statistical software, we employ the Augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF Test) test for unit root (Dickey & Fuller, 1981).  E-views allow users to automatically 
select the lag length, or specify a fixed positive integer value.  In the report lag selection is 
automatically performed by E-views.  The ADF tests were performed on all variables including 
dependent variables and independent.  The results are presented in the chapter 5.   
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Chapter 5 presents regressions and empirical findings of the study.  Table 5 below shows the ADF 
test results for SARB aggregated data.   
 
Table 5: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Results: Aggregated Data 
 
 
The ADF statistic value for Default ratio is -10.49859, the associated one-sided p-value is 0.0000, 
and less than 0.05, thus we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the series has no unit root.  In 
addition, the statistic ADF value tα is less than the critical values so that we reject the null at 1%, 
5%, and 10% critical values.   
The p-value associated with ABSAHP variable is 0.9989 and greater than 0.05 indicating that the 
series has a unit root; in addition the ADF value tα at 1.5336 is greater than the critical values so we 
fail to reject the null at 1%, 5%, and 10% critical values and conclude that the series has a unit root 
or non-stationary.  When we apply first differencing, the ADF statistic value tα at -3.5692 is greater 
than the 1% however less than 5% and 10% critical values.  Thus we reject the null hypothesis at 1% 
and fail to reject the null at 5% and 10% critical values.   
The ADF statistic value for CPI is -3.8502, the associated one-sided p-value is 0.0057, and less than 
0.05, thus we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the series has no unit root.  Furthermore, 
the statistic ADF value tα is less than the critical values so that we reject the null at 1%, 5%, and 
10% critical values. 
The variable credit growth has an ADF statistic value tα is -4.3839, the associated one-sided p-value 
is 0.0014, and less than 0.05, thus we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that Credit has no unit 
root.  In addition, it is important to note that the statistic ADF value tα is less than the critical values 
so that we reject the null at 1%, 5%, and 10% critical values. 
The variable debt to income ratio proved to have a unit root as shown in the ADF results above.  
ADF value tα at -1.5527 is greater than the critical values at 1%, 5%, and 10% significant levels.  In 
addition, the p-value is greater than 0.05.  Performing first differencing we get results shown in table 
5 above.  The p-value is less than 0.05 and the ADF statistical value tα at -5.189674 is less than the 
critical values so we reject the null at 1%, 5%, and 10% critical values and conclude that change in 
debt to income has no unit root. 
The ADF unit root test results on unemployment show that the p-value associated with this variable 
is 0.2210 and greater than 0.05 indicating that the variable has a unit root.  In addition the ADF value 
Variables Default ratio
Absa House 
Price Index
∆(Absa 
House Price 
Index)
Consumer 
Price Index
Credit 
Growth
Debt-to-
income 
ratio
∆ (Debt-to-
income)
Unemploy
ment
∆ 
(Unemplo
yment)
Prime 
interest 
rates
∆(Prime 
interest 
rates)
Regression coefficient -0.1008 0.0318 0.7412 -0.0492 -0.1424 -0.1339 0.5360 -0.1160 -1.0025 0.0026 -0.7707
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -10.4986 1.5336 -3.5692 -3.8502 -4.3839 -1.5527 -5.1897 -1.3701 -5.4541 0.0797 -4.4791
P-value 0.0000 0.9989 0.0136 0.0057 0.0014 0.4956 0.0002 0.5855 0.0001 0.9595 0.0011
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Critical value at 1% -3.6329 -3.6999 -3.6999 -3.6329 -3.6329 -3.6329 -3.6537 -3.6329 -3.6394 -3.6329 -3.6394
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Critical value at 5% -2.9484 -2.9763 -2.9763 -2.9484 -2.9484 -2.9484 -2.9571 -2.9484 -2.9511 -2.9484 -2.9511
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Critical value at 10% -2.6129 -2.6274 -2.6274 -2.6129 -2.6129 -2.6129 -2.6174 -2.6129 -2.6143 -2.6129 -2.6143
 
5.   REGRESSION AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
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tα at -2.168 is greater than the critical values, so we fail to reject the null at 1%, 5%, and 10% critical 
values and conclude that the series has a unit root or is non-stationary.  After first differencing, the 
series proved to be stationery; the ADF statistic value tα at -6.1161 is less than critical values at 1%, 
5%, and 10% significant levels and the p-value is less than 0.05. 
The unit root test results for the variable Prime show the p-value at 0.9595, which is greater than 
0.05 indicating that the variable has a unit root.  In addition the ADF value tα at 0.0797 is greater 
than the critical values so we fail to reject the null at 1%, 5%, and 10% critical values and conclude 
that the series has a unit root or is non-stationary.  We perform first differencing on the series.  After 
first differencing, the variable proved to be stationery; the ADF statistic value tα at -4.4791 is less 
than critical values at 1%, 5%, and 10% significant levels and the p-value is less than 0.05.  We 
conclude that change in prime has no unit root. 
The table below shows ADF results for the undisclosed bank. 
 
Table 6: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Results: Undisclosed Bank 
 
 
The ADF unit root test results on all the dependent variables for the undisclosed bank reveal that 
variables have a unit root.  This is evident in the p-values which are all greater than 0.05.  After first 
differencing, all dependent variables proved to be stationery; the ADF statistic value tα less than 
critical values at 1%, 5%, and 10% significant levels and the p-values  less than 0.05.  The ADF test 
performed on the independent variables show that only the variables credit growth and Absa house 
price index, of the six variables proved to be stationery.  Credit growth is stationery, with an ADF 
statistic value tα of 4.1878, and a p-value of 0.0016.  However, variables CPI, unemployment, and 
prime became stationery upon first differencing, while debt to income ratio became stationary on 
second differencing. 
Having tested for unit roots in variables and performed differencing where necessary, we then run 
the OLS regression model.  The OLS regression results are discussed in the section 5.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variables
30 day 
delinquent
∆(30 day 
delinquent)
60 day 
delinquent
∆(60 day 
delinquent)
90 day 
delinquent
∆(90 day 
delinquent)
Absa House 
Price Index
Consumer 
Price Index
∆(Consumer 
Price Index)
Credit 
Growth
Debt-to-
income ratio
∆ (Debt-to-
income)
∆∆(Debt-to-
income)
Unemploym
ent
∆ 
(Unemploym
ent)
Prime 
interest 
rates
∆(Prime 
interest 
rates)
Regression coefficient -0.0650 -1.212852 -0.0359 -0.4763 -0.0062 -0.5022 -0.0058 -0.0329 -0.5633 -0.0203 -0.0503 -0.2987 -2.7049 -0.1265 -1.0053 0.0009 -0.7278
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.5863 -9.564053 -1.6393 -3.8650 -0.7524 -4.2727 -3.1808 -1.2458 -4.6388 -4.1878 -2.3523 -1.9515 -22.9689 -2.2099 -7.4556 0.0320 -5.4839
P-value 0.4831 0.0000 0.4562 0.0041 0.8246 0.0012 0.0267 0.6485 0.0004 0.0016 0.1599 0.3070 0.0001 0.2051 0.0000 0.9574 0.0000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Critical value at 1% -3.5482 -3.5504 -3.5504 -3.5504 -3.5504 -3.5504 -3.5600 -3.5504 -3.5504 -3.5504 -3.5550 -3.5550 -3.5550 -3.5482 -3.5504 -3.5482 -3.5504
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Critical value at 5% -2.9126 -2.9135 -2.9135 -2.9135 -2.9135 -2.9135 -2.9177 -2.9135 -2.9135 -2.9135 -2.9155 -2.9155 -2.9155 -2.9126 -2.9135 -2.9126 -2.9135
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Critical value at 10% -2.5940 -2.5945 -2.5945 -2.5945 -2.5945 -2.5945 -2.5967 -2.5945 -2.5945 -2.5945 -2.5956 -2.5956 -2.5956 -2.5940 -2.5945 -2.5940 -2.5945
35 
 
5.1   Estimation results and evaluation 
The regression results are given on table 7 below.   
 
Table 7: Regression Results: Aggregated Data 
 
The estimated regression model is as follows: 
 
𝐷𝑡 = −3.12 +   1.31∆ 𝐷𝑡𝑜𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − 2.99𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 +  4.85𝐶𝑃𝐼 −   2.58∆𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐴𝐻𝑃𝑡−8 − 0.32∆𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡−3  0.48∆𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡−2 + 𝑒𝑡    (19)     
 
The analysis of the results focuses on identifying macroeconomic factors that explain default ratios 
rates for residential loans.  R2 exceeds 0.94, indicating that about 94 percent of the movements in the 
default ratios can be explained by the model.  Credit growth, CPI, and Absa house price index are the 
only variables that significantly explain default rates and exhibit the expected direction.  The 
variables prime interest rates, debt to income ratio, and unemployment were not significant; debt to 
income exhibited the expected direction of influence while prime and unemployment showed an 
unexpected negative relationship. 
 
The regression results suggest the following: 
• Default ratios increase as the change in the debt to income ratio for bond holders increases.  
An increase in the debt income ratio suggest that debt has increased more relative to income 
and therefore consumers heavily indebted find it hard to meet monthly payments and 
therefore they default.  Although the variable exhibited the expected positive influence on 
default rates, it’s insignificant at a 5% level.  The results are consistent with findings by 
Herzog and Earley (1970), who found mortgage payment-to-borrower income to be 
insignificant in explaining delinquency risks.  They argued that both lenders and borrowers 
avoid situations where the ratios exceed critical limits unless there is assurance that 
payments will be made from non-income sources.  However, the argument does not seem 
reasonable in the case of South Africa.  Prior the introduction of the National Credit Act 
(NCA) in 2005, many South African households were heavily indebted with their expenses 
well exceeding their incomes.  The NCA was government’s measure to curb incidents of 
debt.  Its purpose is to ensure that lenders refrain from granting consumers credit they do not 
afford. 
Variables ∆(Absa 
House Price 
Index)
Consumer 
Price Index
Credit 
Growth
∆ (Debt-to-
income)
∆ 
(Unemplo
yment)
∆(Prime 
interest 
rates)
Regression coefficient -2.5783 4.8492 -2.9931 1.3089 -0.4762 -0.3178
Standard Error 1.2311 0.2847 0.7173 1.1625 1.1882 0.2273
T-Statistic -2.0943 17.0324 -4.1729 1.1260 -0.4008 -1.3981
P-Value 0.0492 0.0000 0.0005 0.2735 0.6928 0.1774
R 2 egression coefficient 0.9432
Adjusted R 2 e gression coefficient 0.9262
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• Default rates increase as the percentage of credit growth increases.  These findings are 
consistent with expectations.  Expansion of loan portfolios may lead to new loans being 
originated without adequate screening and risk management.  When the criteria for granting 
loans relaxes, credit quality decreases.  The introduction of the National Credit Act in 2007 
coupled with the need to gain market share led to banks writing new loans aggressively and 
which eventually compromised asset quality.  Nedbank whose strategy was to grow market 
share during 2007/8, continues to feel the effects of the business written in the 2007/8 
vintages, with the defaulted portfolio remaining at elevated levels.   
• Default ratios increase as the CPI increases.  These findings are in line with expectations.  As 
prices of consumables including transport costs and food prices increase, consumers tend to 
enter into arrears in the bond repayments to meet basic needs.  The results suggest that, over 
time, consumers battle to catch-up on overdue instalments and eventually default. 
• Default ratios decrease as the house prices increases.  These findings are as expected.  The 
results may suggest that house prices increases, improve the borrower's equity position thus 
reducing default risk because homeowners are in a better position to sell if faced with 
financial distress. 
• Default ratios decrease as the change in prime interest rates increase.  Prime interest rate 
exhibited an unexpected negative influence on default rates, given the predominance of 
flexible mortgage interest rates.  South African interest rates were relatively low and stable 
over the sample period.  The results may suggest that due to few variations over the sample 
period, the model could not access adequately the impact of interest rate changes on default 
risk.   
• Default ratios decrease as change in unemployment increase.  Unemployment exhibited an 
unexpected direction of influence on default rates; in addition, the variable is insignificant.  
The result could indicate that the profile of the borrowers is skilled and educated, as South 
African unemployment is characterised mainly with the unskilled population. 
 
Table 8 below shows the regression results for the 30 days delinquency rates.   
 
Table 8: Regression Results: 30 Day Delinquency Rates 
 
 
 
Variables ∆(Absa 
House Price 
Index)
Consumer 
Price Index
Credit 
Growth
∆∆  (Debt-to-
income)
∆ 
(Unemplo
yment)
∆(Prime 
interest 
rates)
Regression coefficient -0.2635 0.0222 0.1310 -0.1797 -0.8961 1.0220
Standard Error 0.3735 0.0125 0.2014 0.6453 0.3908 0.2993
T-Statistic -0.7055 1.7770 0.6503 -0.2785 -2.2927 3.4140
P-Value 0.4840 0.0820 0.5187 0.7819 0.0264 0.0013
R 2 egression coefficient 0.3885
Adjusted R 2 e gression coefficient 0.3105
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The regression equation for 30 day delinquent rates is as follows: 
 
𝐷𝑡 = 0.61 –  0.18∆∆ 𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 0.13𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 +  0.02∆𝐶𝑃𝐼 − 0.26𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐴𝐻𝑃𝑡−5 + 1.02∆𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡−3 −  0.15∆𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡−3 + 𝑒𝑡         (20)                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                             
The regression results for 30 days delinquent rates suggest the following: 
 
• The R2 reading for the regression is at a low 39 percent, indicating that about 39 percent of 
the variation in the log of 30 days delinquency rates is explained by the logs of prime, debt 
to income ratio, CPI, credit growth unemployment and Absa house price index.  The low 
degree of explanation implies that there may be other omitted variables that influence 30 
days delinquency rates including but not limited to client specific variables like loan to 
value, borrower occupation, borrower age, and marital status.  
• The variable prime lagged three months is the only variable that exhibited the correct sign 
and proved to be significant at a 5 percent level of significance.  The partial regression 
coefficient for prime suggests that a percent increase in the change of prime increases 30 day 
delinquency rates by 1.02 percent, ceteris paribus.  According to Absa, early cycle 
delinquencies experienced over 2010 improved as a result of lower rates.  Therefore the 
regression results seem reasonable.   
• When the change in the change of log debt to income ratio increases by a percent, 30 days 
delinquent rates decrease by 0.18 percent, ceteris paribus.  The regression results seem 
unreasonable, higher debt relative to income should increase the chances of a borrower 
becoming delinquent.  
• The partial regression coefficient for credit growth suggests that a percent increase in log of 
credit growth increases 30 day delinquency rates by 0.13 percent, ceteris paribus.  This 
positive relationship is not expected for the 30 days delinquent loans but should hold for the 
severely delinquent loan bucket, 90 plus days delinquent.  This may signify that borrowers 
acquire new credit facilities like overdrafts and credit cards to reduce their mortgage debt to 
keep their accounts in current.  Borrowers may benefit from the credit relief in short term; 
however, over time excessive borrowing will lead to over indebtedness and thus default.   
• With a p value of 0.08, CPI proved to be insignificant at a significance level of 5 percent.  
However the 30 days delinquent rates increase as CPI increases, this seems reasonable as 
higher inflation encourage borrowers to miss mortgage payments so as to meet basic needs. 
• Absa house price index is also insignificant at 5 percent level of significance.  The partial 
regression coefficient for house prices suggest that a percent increase in house prices 
decreases 30 days delinquent rates by 0.26 percent, ceteris paribus.  The inverse relationship 
seems reasonable since increases in house prices improve the borrower's equity position, 
which in turn reduces delinquency risk because homeowners are in a better position to 
refinance or sell if a trigger event occurs.  The results are consistent with findings by Brent et 
al., (2011). 
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• The results show that an increase in unemployment lagged three periods’ reduces the 30 day 
delinquency rates.  The results do not seem reasonable; an unemployed borrower has no or 
less income to service his contractual obligations, thus increasing the probability of 
becoming delinquent on the loan.  The regression results for the 60 days delinquency rates 
are presented on table 9 below. 
 
Table 9: Regression Results: 60 Day Delinquency Rates 
 
The regression equation for 60 day delinquent rates is as follows: 
 
𝐷𝑡 =  0.28 −0.49∆ ∆𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − 0.014∆𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 +  0.0105∆𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡−4  − 0.039∆𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐴𝐻𝑃𝑡−5 + 0.641∆𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡−4 +   0.117∆𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡−4 + 𝑒𝑡    (21)                                                                                                                                                 
 
The regression results for 60 days delinquent loans suggest the following: 
• The R2 for model is 20 percent and suggests that about 20 percent of the variation in the log 
of 60 days delinquency rates is explained by the logs of prime, debt to income ratio, CPI, 
credit growth unemployment and Absa house price index.  The low degree of explanation 
implies that there may be other omitted variables that influence 60 days delinquency rates 
including but not limited to client specific variables like percent of non-owner occupied 
loans, percent of refinance loans, percent denials and number of housing permits issued as 
found by Brent et al., (2011). 
• The variable prime lagged four months is the only variable that exhibited the correct sign 
and proved to be significant at a 5 percent level of significance.  The partial regression 
coefficient for prime suggests that a percent increase in change of prime increases 60 days 
delinquent rates by 0.64 percent, ceteris paribus.   
• When the change of the change in the debt to income ratio increases by a percent, 60 days 
delinquent rates decrease by 0.49 percent, ceteris paribus.  The regression results seem 
unreasonable, higher debt relative to income should increase the chances of a borrower 
becoming delinquent.  
• Regression results show that 60 days delinquent rates decrease as credit growth increases.  
This negative relationship is expected for the 60 days delinquent loans.  This may signify 
that borrowers acquire additional credit to pay off existing credit to benefit from the credit 
relief in short term; however, over time excessive borrowing will lead to over indebtedness 
and enter severe delinquent buckets.   
Variables ∆(Absa 
House Price 
Index)
Consumer 
Price Index
Credit 
Growth
∆∆  (Debt-to-
income)
∆ 
(Unemplo
yment)
∆(Prime 
interest 
rates)
Regression coefficient -0.0392 0.0105 -0.0142 -0.4934 0.1166 0.6410
Standard Error 0.3103 0.0124 0.1237 0.6331 0.3680 0.2970
T-Statistic -0.1263 0.8475 -0.1144 -0.7793 0.3168 2.1584
P-Value 0.9000 0.4011 0.9094 0.4398 0.7528 0.0361
R 2 egression coefficient 0.2037
Adjusted R 2 e gression coefficient 0.0999
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• The variable CPI proved to be insignificant at a significance level of 5 percent.  However the 
60 days delinquent rates increase as CPI increases, this seems reasonable as higher inflation 
pushes borrowers to miss mortgage payments so as to meet basic needs. 
• Absa house price index is also insignificant at 5 percent level of significance.  The partial 
regression coefficient for house prices suggest that a percent increase in house prices 
decreases 60 days delinquent rates by 0.04 percent, ceteris paribus.  The inverse relationship 
seems reasonable since increases in change in house prices improve the borrower's equity 
position, which in turn reduces delinquency risk because homeowners are in a better position 
to refinance or sell if a trigger event occurs.  The results are consistent with findings by 
Brent et al., (2011).   
• The results show that an increase in unemployment lagged four periods’ increases the 60 day 
delinquency rates.  The variable exhibited the expected relationship; an unemployed 
borrower has no or less income to service his contractual obligations, thus increasing the 
probability of becoming delinquent on the loan.  However, the variable proved to be 
insignificant at a significance level of 5 percent.   
 
The regression results for the 90 days past due loans are presented in table 10 below. 
 
Table 10: Regression Results: 90 Day Delinquency Rates 
 
 
The regression equation for 90 day delinquent rates is as follows: 
 
𝐷𝑡 = 1.66 + 0.24∆𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑡−3 𝑡 +  0.02∆𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡−5 − 0.58∆𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐴𝐻𝑃 + 0.40∆𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡−3 − 0.50∆𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡−3 + 𝑒𝑡     (22)                                                                                                                                                                       
 
The regression results for 90 days delinquent rates suggest the following: 
• The R2 for model is 30 percent and suggests that about 30 percent of the variation in the log 
of 90 days delinquency rates is explained by the logs of prime, changes in the debt to income 
ratio, CPI, credit growth, unemployment and the Absa house price index.  The low degree of 
explanation may mean that the model has omitted variables that influence 90 days 
delinquency rates including but not limited to client specific variables like borrower race and 
other macroeconomic variables, like number of building permits and percentage of denials.  
• The variable prime lagged three months exhibited the correct sign and proved to be 
significant at a 5 percent level of significance.  The partial regression coefficient for prime 
Variables ∆(Absa 
House Price 
Index)
∆(Consumer 
Price Index)
Credit 
Growth
∆∆  (Debt-to-
income)
∆ 
(Unemplo
yment)
∆(Prime 
interest 
rates)
Regression coefficient -0.5792 0.0196 0.2365 0.1262 -0.5014 0.3995
Standard Error 0.1995 0.0081 0.0745 0.4430 0.2519 0.1932
T-Statistic -2.9028 2.4273 3.1761 0.2848 -1.9909 2.0673
P-Value 0.0057 0.0192 0.0027 0.7771 0.0525 0.0444
R 2 egression coefficient 0.2976
Adjusted R 2 e gression coefficient 0.2060
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suggests that a percent increase in change of prime increases 90 days delinquent rates by 
0.40 percent, ceteris paribus.   
• When the change in the change of debt to income ratio increases by a percent, 90 days 
delinquent rates decrease by 0.13 percent, ceteris paribus.  Although, the variable is 
insignificant, the direction of influence seems reasonable, higher debt relative to income 
increase the chances of a borrower becoming delinquent.  Similarly,   Herzog and Earley 
(1970) found the mortgage payment-to-borrower income to be insignificant in explaining 
delinquency risks.  They explained that this occurred because both lenders and borrowers 
watch this ratio carefully.  The authors added that lenders and borrowers avoid situations 
where the ratios exceed critical limits unless there is assurance that payments will be made 
from non-income sources. 
• Regression results show that 90 days delinquent rates increase as credit growth increases.  
This positive relationship is reasonable for the 90 days delinquent loans.  This may signify 
that borrowers acquire additional credit to pay off existing credit to benefit from the credit 
relief in short term; however, over time excessive borrowing lead to over indebtedness thus 
borrowers enter severe delinquent loan buckets.   
• The variable CPI proved to be significant at a significance level of 5 percent.  The 60 days 
delinquent rates increase as CPI increases, this seems reasonable as higher inflation pushes 
borrowers to miss mortgage payments so as to meet basic needs. 
• Absa house price index is also significant at 5 percent level of significance.  The partial 
regression coefficient for house prices suggest that a percent increase in change of house 
prices decreases 90 days delinquent rates by 0.58 percent, ceteris paribus.  The inverse 
relationship seems reasonable since increases in house prices improve the borrower's equity 
position, which in turn reduces delinquency risk because homeowners are in a better position 
to refinance or sell if a trigger event occurs.  The results are consistent with findings by 
Brent et al., (2011), Herzog and Earley (1970).  
• The results show that an increase in change in unemployment lagged three periods’ reduces 
the 90 day delinquency rates.  The results do not seem reasonable; an unemployed borrower 
has no or less income to service his contractual obligations, thus increasing the probability of 
becoming delinquent on the loan. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
41 
 
 
Like any other firm, the fundamental objective of bank management is to maximize profits and 
shareholders’ returns. As a result, Bank strategies are more focused on growing asset portfolios and 
gaining market share.  However the art of striking a balance between risk and portfolio growth still 
remains a challenge as seen in the rising default rates between 2006 and 2010.  As evident in the 
recent financial crises, increasing default rates affect banks profitability and the economy at large.  In 
such a context, banks require improved methodologies to better quantify banks’ vulnerabilities to 
different types of economic shocks.  Risk managers would be interested in questions like “what 
would be the impact on default risk of the residential mortgage portfolio if there would be a 3 
percentage points shock for example in interest rates.  This information would aid them in adapting 
credit risk policies and practises to control and avoid losses.  An example of such a credit policy 
would be tightening the loan-to-value ratios to prohibit additional home loan lending when interest 
rates hit 3 percentage points and are higher than existing level of rates.   
 
The study revealed early delinquency rates and severe delinquency rates are affected by different 
macroeconomic conditions.  Prime interest rates were found to the main determinants of 30 day and 
60 day delinquencies for the individual bank.  Such results would aid the banks in implementing loan 
modifications by extending the term of mortgages exposed to negative interest rate shocks.  This 
would bring borrowers to current status and thus prevent foreclosures. 
The house price index, consumer price index, prime, and credit growth were found to be the main 
determinants of 90 day delinquency rates for the individual bank,  while the house price index, CPI, 
and credit growth, determine the 90 day delinquency rates for the big four banks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION  
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Table 11: Regression Results: Risk Indexes  
 
Source: Herzog and Earley (1970) 
 
Table 12: Regression Results: Default, Delinquencies, and Prepayments 
 
Source: Campbell and Dietrich (1983) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Constant 0.3026 0.0943 0.1574
Loan-to-value (RLS) 0.1694 0.0420 0.0704 0.0532 0.0400 0.0160
Term -to-maturity (T) -0.0003 0.0001 0.0049 0.0001 0.0012 0.0004
Loan purpose (P1) 0.4148 0.0139 0.0852 0.0190 0.0285 0.0053
Loan purpose (P2) 0.1191 0.0247 0.0484 0.0302 0.0244 0.0098
Loan purpose (P3) 0.1641 0.0133 0.0560 0.0167 0.0274 0.0053
Prescence and abscenec of junior financing (FJ) 0.1830 0.0136 0.0741 0.0221 0.0579 0.0052
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Constant 0.3589 0.1198 0.1331
Loan-to-value (RLS) 0.1824 0.0487 0.0432 0.0201 0.0473 0.1670
Term -to-maturity (T) -0.0046 0.0001 0.0005 0.0001 0.0023 0.0008
Loan purpose (P1) 0.0513 0.0141 0.0872 0.0187 0.0293 0.0054
Loan purpose (P2) 0.1570 0.0140 0.0541 0.0231 0.0513 0.0063
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Constant 0.2972
Loan-to-value (RLS) 0.4451 0.0812 -0.0168 0.1022
Term -to-maturity (T) -0.0055 0.0002 0.2916 0.0002
Monthly payment to income ratio (RPI) -0.1002 0.1808 0.0005 0.2167
Regression Results: Risk Indexes
Sample Data
Aggregated Published Data
Sample and Aggregated Data
Delinquency Risk 
Equations
Foreclosure Risk 
Equations
Straight Foreclosure Risk 
Equations
Dependent Variables Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Constant -5.62 27.08 -3.06 19.43 2.43 14.52 -7.28 29.51 -5.76 31.74 -1.82 9.55
Current loan-to-value ratio (CLTV) 0.58 3.70 -1.40 12.09 -2.95 22.16 1.23 7.38 -0.39 3.33 -1.44 11.31
Current payment-to-income ratio (CPTY) 0.03 0.29 -3.74 5.44 -11.00 14.35 3.82 3.73 5.30 6.86 2.41 2.96
Rate of unemployment (UNEM) 0.10 16.94 0.05 10.04 -0.05 8.40 0.11 17.44 0.06 13.38 -0.03 5.52
Ratio of the current mortgage rate to contract rate on 
the mortgage (CROR) -0.33 2.70 -0.44 4.91 -1.20 12.64 -0.40 3.14 -0.81 8.87 -1.58 17.56
Age of the mortgage at the beginning of a year(AGE) 0.40 13.24 0.55 20.01 0.81 35.27
Age of the mortgage squared (AGESQ) -0.03 12.67 -0.04 -0.05 28.33
Dummy variable which assumes a value of 1 when a 
home is new, 0 otherwise (DUMNEW)
0.32 11.14 0.13 5.59 0.10 3.94 0.22 7.21 -0.10 4.06 -0.24 9.60
Dummy variable which assumes the value of 1 if the loan 
has an initial loan-to-value ratio greater than 80 and less 
than or equal to 85%, 0 otherwise (DUM85)
-0.28 2.92 -0.06 0.83 0.28 3.19 -0.36 3.83 -0.14 1.97 0.18 2.35
Dummy variable which assumes the value of 1 if the loan 
has an initial loan-to-value ratio greater than 85% and 
less than or equal to 90%, 0 otherwise (DUM90) 
-1.04 20.48 -0.49 12.78 0.44 10.31 -1.15 22.70 -0.65 17.80 0.22 5.86
Dummy variable which assumes the value of 1 if the loan 
has an initial loan-value ratio greater than 90%, 0 
otherwise (DUM95)
-0.20 3.50 -0.22 4.81 0.17 3.39 -0.30 5.24 -0.33 25.24 0.01 0.26
Rp2 0.31 0.48
Log of probability of 
Prepayment (LPPRE)
Age Variables Included Age variables ommitted 
Regression Results
Log of probability of 
Default (LPDEF)
Log of probability of 
Delinquency (LPDEL)
0.25 0.21 0.34 0.28
Log of probability of 
Default (LPDEF)
Log of probability of 
Delinquency (LPDEL)
Log of probability of 
Prepayment (LPPRE)
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Table 13: Regression Results: 30 Day Delinquency Rates 
 
Source: Brent, Kelly, Lindsey-Taliefero, and Price (2011) 
 
Table 14: Regression Results: 60 Day Delinquency Rates 
 
Source: Brent, Kelly, Lindsey-Taliefero, and Price (2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable coefficient t-stat
Significance 
level
coefficient t-stat
Significance 
level
whpet -0.0099 -1.1800 -0.0074 -0.3900
blpct -0.0010 -0.1800 0.0038 0.2900
hispct 0.0015 0.1700 -0.0018 -0.0900
asnpct -0.0019 -0.1000 0.0024 0.0500
ntvpct 0.0045 0.1400 0.1110 1.5100
fempct -0.0411 -1.0000 -0.0414 -0.4400
credscr -0.0066 -0.6400 0.0017 0.0700
income 0.0000 0.1800 0.0001 2.5700 0.0500
nonoccpt -0.0054 -1.0300 -0.0246 -2.0500 0.0500
nivst -0.0470 -3.7800 0.0100 -0.0839 -2.9600 0.0100
spread 0.0130 1.6500 0.0252 1.4100
pctrefi 0.0201 3.7100 0.0100 0.0552 4.4700 0.0100
Iien2nd 0.0028 0.3700 0.0272 1.5500
pctadj 0.0058 0.6600 0.0181 0.9000
denpct -0.0025 -0.4600 0.0032 0.2600
unempl 0.0378 1.6000 -0.0561 -1.0400
numpermt 0.0007 0.5600 0.0067 2.4900 0.0500
hpidx -0.0105 -9.9800 0.0100 -0.0132 -5.5300 0.0100
probusvc 0.0012 0.1800 -0.0101 -0.6700
RR2 0.9928 0.9801
Regression Results
Prime loans
30 day delinquency rate
Subprime loans
Variable coefficient t-stat
Significance 
level
coefficient t-stat
Significance 
level
whpet 0.0037 0.6000 0.0104 0.7500
blpct 0.0059 1.3800 0.0204 2.1600
hispct -0.0080 -1.2000 -0.0113 -0.7700
asnpct -0.0067 -0.4700 0.0079 0.2500
ntvpct -0.0191 -0.8000 -0.0113 -0.2100
fempct -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0205 -0.3000
credscr 0.0014 0.1800 -0.0061 -0.3600
income 0.0000 -2.8100 0.0100 0.0000 -0.4000
nonoccpt -0.0038 -0.9700 -0.0149 -1.7200 0.1000
nivst -0.0270 -2.9600 0.0100 -0.0694 -3.4100 0.0100
spread 0.0065 1.1300 0.0017 0.1300
pctrefi 0.0000 0.0000 0.0263 2.9500 0.0100
Iien2nd -0.0075 -1.3300 -0.0084 -0.6700
pctadj 0.0082 1.2600 0.0132 0.9100
denpct 0.0086 2.1500 0.0500 0.0295 3.3100 0.0100
unempl 0.0519 2.9900 0.0100 0.0855 2.2100 0.0500
numpermt -0.0005 -0.5400 0.0038 1.9500 0.1000
hpidx -0.0038 -4.9700 0.0100 -0.0069 -4.0100 0.0100
probusvc 0.0024 0.5000 -0.0001 -0.0100
RR2 0.9624 0.9925
60 day delinquency rate
Prime loans Subprime loans
Regression Results
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Table 15: Regression Results: 90 Day Delinquency Rates 
 
Source: Brent, Kelly, Lindsey-Taliefero, and Price (2011) 
 
Table 16: Regression Results: Marginal Effects for Ordered Probit 
 
Source: Rebelo and Vaz Caldas (2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable coefficient t-stat
Significance 
level
coefficient t-stat
Significance 
level
whpet 0.0094 0.4300 0.0115 0.1700
blpct 0.0234 1.5600 0.0408 0.9000
hispct -0.0386 -1.6400 -0.0282 -0.4000
asnpct -0.0076 -0.1500 0.2624 1.7200 0.1000
ntvpct -0.1241 -1.4800 0.0448 0.1800
fempct 0.0581 0.5400 -0.1519 -0.4700
credscr 0.0013 0.0500 -0.0058 -0.0700
income -0.0002 -4.3600 0.0100 -0.0001 -0.7700
nonoccpt -0.0064 -0.4700 -0.0548 -1.3200
nivst -0.0521 -1.6100 -0.3008 -3.0800 0.0100
spread 0.0159 0.7800 0.0486 0.7900
pctrefi -0.0354 -2.5000 0.0500 0.0419 0.9800
Iien2nd -0.0271 -1.3500 -0.0535 -0.8800
pctadj 0.0402 1.7500 0.1000 0.0988 1.4200
denpct 0.0329 2.3200 0.0500 0.1373 3.2100 0.0100
unempl 0.2760 4.4900 0.0100 0.5867 3.1600 0.0100
numpermt -0.0022 -0.7100 0.0160 1.6800 0.1000
hpidx -0.0039 -1.4100 -0.0370 -4.4800 0.0100
probusvc 0.0072 0.4100 -0.0229 -0.4400
RR2 0.8631 0.9712
Prime loans Subprime loans
Regression Results
90 day delinquency rate
Variable Y=0 Y=1 Y=2 Y=3 Y=0 Y=1 Y=2 Y=3
Age (X1) 0.0010 0.0015 0.0007* -0.0032 0.0006 0.0010  0.0005* -0.0020*
Marital status (X2) 0.0533*  0.0854*  0.0458* -0.1844**  0.0539*  0.0863* 0.0465*  -0.1867*
Job contract (X3) -0.01490 -0.02200 -0.10200 0.04700 -0.01660 -0.02450 -0.01130 0.05240
Education (X4) 0.00070 0.00110 0.00050 -0.00230 -0.00220 -0.00330 -0.00160 0.00700
Residence place (X5) -0.1027*  -0.1123*  -0.0322*  0.2471* -0.10360 -0.1129* -0.0322* 0.2488*
Household size (X6) -0.0370*  -0.0562*  -0.0272* 0.1204*
Monthly net income (X7) 0.0000* 0.0001* 0.0001* -0.0002*
Monthly net income per-capita (X7a) 0.0001* 0.0002* 0.0001* 0.0004*
# banking loans (X8) -0.0197*  -0.0300* -0.0145** 0.0641*  -0.0196**  -0.0299* -0.0145** 0.0640*
Effort rate (X9) -0.7864* -1.1970* -0.5793* 2.5628* -0.8173* -1.2435* -0.6037* 2.6646*
Loan/real guarantee (X10) -0.2396* -0.3648* -0.1765* 0.7810* -0.1485* -0.2260* -0.1097** 0.4842*
Statitical Significance * Statistical significanct at 1% level; ** Statistical significanct at 5% level; *** Statistical significanct at 10% level
Model 2 Model 4
Regression Results: Marginal effects for Ordered Probit (at the means of the variables)
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